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Abstract
Social Network Sites(SNS) is the soul of the Internet. It has become a global
phenomenon with enormous social as well as economic importance within a few years
of their launch. Because of larger user space SNS has become popular day by day.
Information exploitation popularity in SNS has attracted not only novice users but also
spammers. In SNS spammers are using evolving technology and they safely trading
their illegal activities by phishing through e-mails, Social Reverse Engineering(SRE),
by posting some incite messages. The novice users often becomes victim to these
malicious activity which impacts them both socially and economically. The study
show that because of this illegal activity the SNS organisers and users are loosing $2
million for three months. In this thesis we exploited the security gap that many popular
SNS services like Twitter, Facebook do not provide to its users. We have collected a
large scale of long URLs and short URLs from multiple sources of SNS which are
checked against malicious and non-malicious detectors and we analyse their features
to classify the URLs. Our result shows that Naı¨ve Bayes classifier performs better then
other classifier algorithm with accuracy 95.4%.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter gives the overview of the thesis. Description of Social Network Services.
Describes the security issues in SNS. Common attacks in SNS and the motivation of
my research.
1.1 Social Network Sites(SNS)
From ancient time man is called as a social animal. From his beginning man has main-
tained a social relation with nature, animals and with a fellow human being. It was this
social relationship that helps him to have a close relationship in the universe with one
another. In modern times with increase in population the SNSs has become an easy and
a much efficient platform in maintaining social relationships. Online Social Network
sites like Facebook, Twitter, Linkedln, MySpace or Google+ has become popular sites
in Internet platform. They have attracted of all ages from technicians to novice users.
In the wide area sphere like research, industries, business, working Office, news media,
organization, entrepreneurship SNS have become a daily practice in use. Mostly SNS
have mainly used for information sharing and to express on common interest views
example political view.
1.1.1 Definition of SNS
SNS are basically a web-based application which usually allows the individual to con-
struct the semi-public data [16] with in a closed system, articulate a list of users to
whom an individual can connect, share information, express their common view in a
common platform. SNS allow the individual to meet the strangers of common interest,
1
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and view and traverse the list of one’s individual connection. Though SNS vary from
one to the other in terms of their nomenclature in connection and service provision to
its users, the basic principality is to share information. The following Table 1 show the
most popular SNS in brief.
1.2 Security Issues in SNSs
For the past few decades the popularity in SNS [17] such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+
has increased rapidly. Though it has attracted all age groups, but the youngster has out-
set among the other groups. SNSs has become an important communication platform
in social life, with increasing security concern over a period of time. Some of the secu-
rity breaches may be like viral marketing, network, structural attacks malware attacks.
Some of them are explained briefly as follow.
• Privacy Breach Attack : SNS allow the individual to construct their SNS network
with semi-public data like date-of-birth, current address, photo, videos. Such
ready available personal information can mark for privacy Breaches.
• Breaches by Service Provider : This readily available data may be used by the
one’s service provider for advertisement purpose to benefit them in multi-ways.
As such the data may fall into the hands of untrustworthy person.
•Breach form Third Party : To have more functionality the user in the SNSs may
use the trusted third party application. To use such application the user must
have to accept or compromise some privacy issues by accepting theirs term and
conditions.
1.2.1 Viral Marketing
Because SNS has been formed by the real people, they are an easy target for the viral
marketing. The public perception that the information shared with their friend are
of trust messages. These perceptions have benefited spammers to attack the users by
employing the SRE trick to enhance the viral management effectiveness. Some of the
viral management issues are outlined as below.
2
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SNS service providers
Service Provider
Name
Description Date Launch Registered Users
Flickr Photo sharing,
commenting,
photography re-
lated networking,
worldwide
February 2004 32,000,0007
Facebook General: photos,
videos, blogs,
apps.
February 2004 1,280,000,000
Haboo General for teens.
Over 31 commu-
nities worldwide.
Chat room and
user profiles
August 2000 268,000,000
lbibo Talent based
social networking
site that allows
to promote one’s
self and also
discover new
talent
2007 3,500,000
Istagram A photo and
video sharing
site.
October 2010 AS 150,000,000
LinkedIn Business and
professional
networking
May 2003 200,000,000
Myspace General August 2003 30,000,000
Google+ General 28 June 2011
Open to people
13 and older
120,000,000
Table 1.1: Social Networking Services
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Spam in SNSs
Spam in SNSs are of two types mainly.
• Context-aware Spamming : Context-aware Spamming is the advantage taken by
the spammers by click-through mechanism. Here the spammers analyze the tar-
get users behavior and post the malicious content in a obfuscate manner. Here
the spammers incite the users, and draw attention to click their post message.
When the user clicks the obfuscate message he get trapped of spamming .
• By Broadcasting : Here the user may not have any particular target, but broadcast
the abusive content on the SNSs. Here the spammer may use the sexy photos
and seduce content to attract the users .
• Phishing Attack : Phishing Attack Figure 1.1 is usually employed by the attackers
to steal the credential attacks by the spammers. This is one of the most popular.
Figure 1.1: Phishing Attack
Viral Marketing method in SNSs. Novice persons in the SNSs usually attack by
the spammers.
• Social Reverse Engineering(SRE) :SRE is usually used as a bait for the users so
that the users by themselves get into the trap of the attackers. This may usually
does by the attackers by posting popular post and by e-mails.
1.2.2 Network Structural Attack
A change in the in the Network structure by the malicious attackers [33] may result
a serious threat in SNSs if the SNSs in mainly based on membership. One such type
4
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
attack is Sybil Attack.
•Sybil Attack is a general Figure 1.2 form attack on malicious attack where the ma-
licious attacker creates a number of fake identities which outvote the genuine
identities. This attack may set aside the intended purpose of the SNSs.
Figure 1.2: Sybli Attack
1.2.3 Malware
Malware is a concrete term used to refer to any form of hostile or intrusion software like
computer virus, worm, trojan horses, spyware, adware and other malicious program.
Due to present of large information the attackers are also employed to trade malware
content in SNSs. It can spread in SNSs by profile, interaction, a third party application.
Koobface is the first successful worm the attacker spread in SNSs. Koobface infection
allows attacker to get into your personal information like your banking information,
passwords, or other personal details. It is considered a security risk and should be
removed from the network.
Koobface [30] is an worm traded on Facebook , it work as follow.
• Register and activates a Facebook account by using the Gmail-account
• Join random Facebook groups
• Post in the wall of the friends which coantians koobface component
The following Table 1.2 shows the impact factor of the different attacks
5
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Brief about SNSs Attack
Measure Attack Phising Sybil Malware Spamming
Difficult, Yes Hard Hard easy
Server Defence
Effectiveness
No Yes Yes but limited
effectiveness
Yes
User Defence Ef-
fectiveness
Yes No Yes but limited
effectiveness
No
Threat to User High Medium High Low
Table 1.2: Impact of various attacks in SNSs
Common attacks in SNSs
Attacks Description
ID Theft The presence of semi-public data available helps the
attackers to theft ID of the target SNS users
Profile Cloning The users in the SNSs generally trust the other pro-
files with same interest area . Thus the attackers will
impersonate the genuine user are by creating clone
profile.
Secondary Data Collec-
tion
Here the attackers collect the data available in SNSs
and extract the useful information like SSN number,
particularly such information where the attacker can
access the target particular users information.
Communication Track-
ing
The movement of data in SNSs arises the concern of
communication privacy . Here the malicious SNSs
provider or malicious member with the appropriate
set of privilege can be able track the communication.
It is very difficult to identify such attack.
Defamation and Ballot
Stuffing
These attacks are generally target the particular mem-
ber to defame their reputation by posting them ob-
scene content or text.
Friend-in-the-middle
Man Attack
Here the attackers hijack the HTTP session in the net-
work layer , where he retrieves the cookies and the
them, then start attack them by impersonating as a
genuine user
Friend Injection Here the attackers the network session and then add
themselves as an friend and penetrates into the closed
group.
Application Injection Third party application such as online games , popular
SNS or hiding malicious hiding a malicious applica-
tion without any activity visible to the user is possible.
The attacker will install application which automati-
cally collect the personal data of the users.
Table 1.3: Common attacks in SNSs
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1.3 Common Attacks in SNSs
The following Table1.3 shows the common attacks in SNSs. Some of the attacks mea-
sures from easy to hard.
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1.4 Research Motivation and Aim
1.4.1 Research Motivation
Application of advanced information technology in web service has offered many ser-
vices to its users. The services may range from chatrooms, sending text, information
sharing, and multimedia sharing. The above mentioned services are built in one place
as an SNS, hence its usage and popularity increasing rapidly. With the growing num-
ber of SNSs services in internet correspondingly there is a huge amount of information
disseminated. This large amount of information is usually used in research to analyze
the user behavior like social relation, information trading. Mostly some of the popu-
lar SNSs like Facebook, Google+, Myspace, Twitter have attracted a large number of
users. As the increasing number of users, the SNSs services started providing various
functionality like charting rooms, sharing information, advertisement etc. Hence SNSs
has seen as an economic growth platform for some of the entrepreneurship.
Unfortunately, SNSs have attracted the attackers and started attacking on SNSs by
a phishing attack, inject malicious code, and launching drive-by-download attacks.
These malicious attacks have led to serious privacy crime and economic crime. Once
the user click through this malicious content the user will take to the other users with-
out their notice, which embedded with malicious code which steals the personal in-
formation and credential of the user, by this they fall into the victims of the malicious
attackers The SNS begin its era in a slow phased manner and emerged as a soul of the
internet. It has fascinated all groups of ages, and marked as a part of the social commu-
nity. The researches for the past decades has seen SNS as a huge information reposit.
From then onward the SNS services are trying to provide the best security features to
their users. Anyhow the spammers, phishers have resisted to these security techniques
and evolve to the new techniques those cannot be identified by the traditional technique
(blacklisting). One of the most prevailing technique that spammer are using in the SNS
is a short URL technique.
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Short URLs Services
From the beginning of the short URL services the use of short URLs had become a
norm in SNSs where generally character limitation exists (Twitter has 140 character
limit). The usage of the short URLs has resulted in a space reduction methodology in
the SNSs. The following draws the attention of the space reduction Figure1.3 reduction
by short URLs.
Figure 1.3: Space Reduction by shorting long URLs
1.5 Advantage and Disadvantage of Short URLs
The short URL services take the long URLs as input and give corresponding short
URLs with a unique Hashtag, generally append at last. For example, the long URL
https://pypi.python.org/pypi/python-graph is given to the any short URLs services as
bit.ly it returns the short URLs as https://bit.ly/xxxxx. Though short URL services
resulted in space, reducing methodology in SNSs but it has resulted in a security breach
like cybercrime. The resulted short URLs may be malicious or benign. The malicious
short URLs are obfuscate in nature and cannot be identified by traditional methods
(blacklisting). The multiple redirection of short URL has made it very difficult to
identify the real malicious URLs.
9
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Literature Survey
2.1 Literature Review
With the limitation of the text characters in SNSs for example, in Twitter(140 charac-
ter) has made the SNSs users to use shorter services. The following Table 2.1 are some
of the short URL services that are popular in use. The above are shortened services
Table 2.1 takes input a long URL and it returns the short URL This short URL that is
generate will redirect to the same long URL but the short URL looks random and ob-
fuscate in nature. The character limit of the SNS has laid immense usage of short URL
services. As stated Figure 1.3 though URL shorten has reduced the space in textbooks
of the SNS. Due to obfuscate usage these services it leads to security breaches in SNS.
Information Security is of growing interest of policy makers as society become
more dependent on secure communication. Andreson and Moore [30] in their research
work have briefly explained about the security concern in economic perspective how
these malicious content have impact the economic issue. Despite this large malicious
activity, information about the malicious content and the losses done by such crimes
have largely remained hidden from public crime. The reasons may be as follow. First
fear of negative impact on public which arises if incident are openly discard and dis-
cussed Second some argues that disclose of information about the incident actually aid
attackers more than it helps defenders. Ransbitham [8] has observe that vulnerability
in open source software are more frequently exploited by attackers in open software
than in closed software.
Yet there are also some clear benefit to public disclosure of malicious incident. First
the criminal already know how to attack on SNSs by disclosure the security incident
10
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Short URLs Domains
Domain Site Tittle
Tinyurl.com Tiny.URL
Bit.do Bit.do
Indkin LinkendIn
qr.ae Quora
adf.ly Adf.ly
goo.gl Google
is.gd Is.gd
u.ub Adf.ly
tweez.me Tweez.me
tr.im Tr.in
Table 2.1: Feature of the short URLs
the ‘defenders’ can know how the attacker incident can work and an effective counter
measure can employed to not to happened in future.
Secondly, information threat is an key barrier to optimal security investment . Bet-
ter measurement to optimal security investment and impact of incident can help or-
ganisation to better to tightened their security features from the frequent impact of the
incident.
Thirdly, bring incident to publicity will help the defender to quickly identify the
attack impact measures and find some loop hole.
Meanwhile, firm have undertaken a no of collaborative efforts to impose security
without disclosing result publicity. Google operates a large blacklist [12] of malicious
website and URLs which marked as spam, malware, worm without revealing the in-
formation about the infected website.
The spammer uses number of techniques to find any vulnerabilities in the website.
The way they can employ is by scanner. Scanner is the technique where the spammers
scan the other website and such for some loop holes and inject some rootkits [26]. A
rootkit is a stealth type of software , typically malicious design, to hide the existence of
certain process from normal method of detection and help to find some loopholes from
which they access the privilege of the server. By applying rootkits they compromise
the other end software. Then they exploit the machine for their own purpose, and sell to
the third party. If rootkit is not added the criminal adds few websites and does phishing
11
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attack.
Hu Huaping, Weijianli [19] have analyse how the IM(Instant Message) has become
one of the popular online communication tools among the users in SNS. The added
functionality and increasing popularity has attracted the attackers, by sending worm,
malicious content from current list of content .
Federio Maggi et al. [24] has exclusive research on short URL for two years and
analyse the security threat and explain the countermeasure. They said that users are
seldom exposed, while browsing to threat spread via short URL or atleast no more
than they are exposed to the same thread spread via long URLs.
Neils Provos and Dean McName et al. [25]have explain how drive-by-download
malicious URLs link has exploited the threads in SNS.
Zhan et al. [27] has analyse that the many phishing sites are design by some modifi-
cation of popular site. He analyse the phising site by content based method like lexical
analyse, HTML content, domain name, Google page ranking.
Fette et al. [36] has analyse the feature of the email by HTML tag, number of links,
by using the SVM. Bergholz et al. did the same kind of work like he use email bodies,
weblink , keyword properties by using Markov chain training. Abe-Nimen et al. has
used 43 most popular keyword.
Ma et al. [6] has done the similar work but he added more specific feature like
host machine features like IP address, WHOIS, domain name, regional location and he
classified by machine learning classifier by Bayesian and SVM.
Morse et al. [7] has research on the highly connected nodes. From that he analyse
that highly connected nodes are responsible for the spreading of worm through out of
the network.
Koobface which attack the facebook and Myspace primarily by sending that con-
tains like malicious website and leverage various SNSs information.
Thomas et al. [31] has contributed by collection more than 213 thousands users
who compromised on Koobface, such web sites are taken more than four days to black-
listed and only 27% of URLs are detected as malicious and stated 81% users clicked
on Koobface spam.
Stringhini et al. [29] used decoy profile approach for collecting social information
12
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from SNS feature and they are used to identify spamming in social network without
considering the malicious link or content posted. They concluded that spammer would
send numerous friend request but they were not a real-life friends of others.
Jin et al. [20] used three types of features like image content text, social network
features, used to characters the user profile and their behaviour.
2.2 Analysis of Malicious Long URLs
The pervious study has conducted to understand how the attackers has been URL to
spread their spam in the SNS, many previous study has contributed how the spam and
phishing is spread through email, and they concluded that the attacker have heavily
used URLs to spread the bad Content. Benevenuto et al. [9] collected a large scale of
URLs of nearly 2 billion and identify the features of the URLs which detect spam on
Twitter. And after the manual labelling of features they classified and achieved 70%
accuracy. They have founded that a fraction of tweets particularly of some hot topics
contains more number of URLs then other. This clearly highlights to what extend the
attackers has been using. Though the research has came up the most efficient popular
blacklisting in detecting spam but it has been observed that their evaluation technique
has not suitable for the detecting spam in the Twitter when the user employs the short
URLs technique for the particular long URL as they are in obfuscate in nature. By
using this services the attacker has taken more advantage in trading their illicit con-
tent. In such case in both Twitter and Facebook by using such services, the spammer
has complicated the process of detecting ny applying the multiple chain re-direction.
Wang et al. [34]. in research they used the Click rate measure as a feature and con-
cluded that the rate of spam in Twitter is (0.13%) is higher amount of spam that spread
through spam e-mails. Thomas et al. [32] have develop an automatic system named
Monarch through which they have classify the URL submitted to any web services as
malicious or non-malicious in real time . Their classification is based on the landing
page properties on the webpage like html tag, hosting infrastructure, pop-ups , plugins,
cookies, content .Thought it may be the most effective method which is based on the
content search it reduces the performance issues. Their classification is based on the
landing page properties on the webpage like html tag, hosting infrastructure, pop-ups,
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plugins, cookies, content. Thought it may be the most effective method which is based
on the content search it reduces the performance issues. Lee in his contribution has re-
veal that spammer has employ the multiple redirection methods to a malware/phishing
website. As his contribution he created a system that would not fall as prey to con-
ditional redirection. In his classification he has used both the conditional redirection
with the accuracy of 86.3% was attained
2.3 Analysis of Malicious Short URLs
Reduction of the space reduction in the SNSs and their heavy usage of short URLs
services , therefore, there must be a comparative level of understand level of accep-
tance of the short URL services in SNSs. Kandylas et al. [21] research confirmed that
the attackers have used short URLs to trade their illicit work and they found that the
malicious short URL by clicked based method. And they concluded that the usage
of the short URLs in trading malicious URLs is more then by long URL. They also
found that duration of the short URLs is less than the long URLs by which they evade
the security check. The dataset they have collected by crawling the webpage , they
dataset mainly consist of two domain short URLs and reveal that 50% of the short
URLs exceeds 100 days. They have analyse that the usage of the short URL services
is because of the space reduction. concentrated mainly on the malicious short URLs in
the emails and highlighted the privacy and security concern by the short URLs service
over the SNSs. They found a lot of private user information traces associated with
short URLs and observed a low spam detection rate for 16 shortening services they
analysed. For a particular short URL domain they found that 57% of them are bit.ly.
Chhabra et al. [14] has also found that the attackers has employ short URL not only
for the space reduction but also to spread phishing attack in twitter. They also found
that the attackers employs the short URLs technique to hide their malicious link.
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Research Contribution
In first part of our research contribution, we have collected a large scale of URLs
from SNS like Facebook [1], Twitter [2] by using their secure APIs [13] which are
provided by them to their registered users. These API allows us to collect data from
Public Domain, and allows the users by using search method followed by keyword as
an input. The major study finding are
• The analysed malicious URLs heavily referred to many SNSs.
• They are short lived and registered with unpopular domains which are also short
lived.
• We have analyse that their exit a large number of communication Propagation
that Malicious illegal trade activity in SNSs.
In second part of our research contribution we have analyse the behaviour of the
URLs by there feature which enables them to classification.
• These features enable to detect the behaviour of the URLs like benign or mali-
cious.
• They show the security breaches the present in Facebook and Twitter.
Finally, after identifying the security breaches in SNSs through URLs we have
classified the large scale of URLs by classifier algorithms .
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• Unlike the existing previous studies our research contribution doesn’t depends
only on Bitly but on wide range of short URLs services like Bitly [3], Twitter [2],
Owly etc.
• We have not only rely on Online Detectors to identify the malicious character of
the URLs but we also used the lexical standard feature to detect the Malicious
character of the URLs.
• Our classification work efficiently when we employ the combination of features
like click, life time of the URL, Domain life time, References. And our results
shows that Navies Bayesian has out perform the best classification result.
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Solution Approach
4.1 Exploitation of URLs in SNS
As the popularity of SNS are marking high in the internet world, it is not only used for
information sharing, but also used for the trading of the illicit content [30] [35] on SNS
which varies from Worm, virus, drive-by- download, kbooface, phishing etc. Our re-
search contribution is mainly focused on the URLs. URLs are used as bait for the users
to trap the users where they end with the reveal of the sensitivity and credential infor-
mation. It has been observed that a well experienced community on the internet spread
the malicious content the URLs in SNS. The attackers [10] employs many different
techniques like short URLs technique where usually a long URL is given to the avail-
able short URL services and result back the equivalent short URL with unique hash
tag.The attacker may also employ the malicious URLs [12] by creating the malicious
URLs which is very similar to the popular existing URLs. Our research mainly focused
on the URLs which contained both short and long URLs, which involves wide range of
security breaches ranging from malicious, worm, virus, malware, phishing [28]. Be-
cause the usage of URL is the main obfuscate method that the attackers employ to hide
from the scanner checkers and invades the target.
4.2 Suspicious Long URLs Exploitation
4.2.1 Long URLs Data Collection
Our long URL data collection contains the URLs [12] , where some of the URLs land
the user the to the intended landing page and few others redirects from one page to the
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other page. Such a way the attackers employ multiple redirection technique to evades
the security scanners. These multiple redirection had made the security observers very
difficult to detect the attackers. In some instances the attackers has used the some pop-
ular long URLs and modified them to trade their malicious URLs. In some cases they
have used the unpopular domain and get registered their URLs [11] whose domain info
do not have with the security observer. The other technique the attackers employ is that
they registered themselves with the domain for a short period of life span which make
them to evade without any security checking. We have also concentrated on lexical
features to detect the malicious of Long URLs, we have used these feature form the
standard red tag words, these words are the already available tag words which are used
to detect the suspicious features of the URLs. In our research, we have used nearly 13
features which are as below.
Lexical Feature [18]help us with analysis to detect the URLs which are different
from the benign and help to mark them as malicious. For example, www.amazon.com
is a benign but the attackers employ the obfuscate method in which the spammers use
the most popular URLs illicit manner like www.amazon.com.phishy.xxxxxx.
Similarly the most effective traditional method is crawling webpage [18] and search-
ing of all malicious content like hyperlink, spamming emails. This method results in
high accuracy, but it is much tedious and time consuming when the user employs dy-
namic changing content technique in web services.
4.3 Suspicious Short URLs Exploitation
4.3.1 Short URLs Data Collection
Because of the evolution of the emerging technology, the attackers have used the
most efficient methods to trade their illicit content on the SNSs, one of the such tech-
nology is the usage of the short URLs services. Due to the characters limit in social
networks (for example 140 characters in Twitter) the users used the social network
services as a space, reducing technology in SNSs. Due to the increasing popularity in
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usage of the short URLs services which comes by obfuscate behavior in SNS it has
not only attracted the genuine users but also the attackers to use them as a safe trading
methodology for their malicious data trading.
We have collected a large Figure4.1 set of URLs from the SNSs like Facebook and
Twitter [23] by their APIs which are freely provided for their registered users, from
where, we have separated the Long and short URLs of different domains like Twitter,
Facebook, Owly, Tiny URL, Bitly.
Figure 4.1: Popular short URL services collection
For collected short URLs Figure 4.1 we have analyzed them by their features Table
4.1 which are provided by their respective services. The following are some of the
features that they have provided for analysis their short URLs some of them are listed
below. These features help us to analyze the behavior of the short URLs, for example
the countries feature [22] help us to analyze the referrer of the short URL from different
countries. Click feature [34] used to analyze why the malicious URLs have a low
number of click.info used to analyze the link creation and creation time. Referring
domain help to analyze the domain referring click traffic.
We have collected a large scale of URLs which consist of both the long and short
URL. Then we used the available Malicious detectors like VirusTotal [4], Bitly, Phish-
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Features of the short URLs
Features Description
expand expansion of short URL to Long URL
info basic information of the URLs
lookup page title
shotern for the long URL return short URL
linkedit link meta info form the user history
domain to know the domain of the URL
clicks click count of the requested URLs
countries countries reffering click traffic
encoder the user who encode the user
reffers return about page referring click traffic
refferbydomain click group by referring short URL do-
main
history created before, created after information
prodoamin gives information about the domain of the
short URL
doaminclick click on the particular domain
domainshiorterncount specfied tracking domain
Table 4.1: Feature of the short URLs
tank, Google Safe Browsing, and we marked as a malicious and non-malicious as ’1’
and ’0’. and we use above features for classification.
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Experiment and Detection of URLs
This chapter gives the overview of the Experiment and analysis of our research work.
5.1 Proposed Model
The following proposed Figure 5.1 model briefly explains the approach that we have
followed in our research. It starts with the data collection model where the data are
collected from the Facebook, and Twitter, followed by extraction of URLs and their
features, and by labelling, followed by the feature extraction and then by classification
and the result of the classification algorithm. The following section briefly explains
each and every module in detail.
5.2 Data Collection Approach
Tweets
Tweets are the short message services provided by the Twitters to their users to share
information. These tweets may be Public visible and also privately according to the
option set by the users. Because of the limitation of space (140 character in Twitter)
the users are forced to use short URLs. Though it really reduces the space, it has many
disadvantages. Because of the small and attractive of the short URLs nature it attracts
the novice users to go around it and fall into spammers, phisher traps.
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Figure 5.1: Proposed Model
Figure 5.2: Data Collection
Twitter API
Twitter provides its own authenticated API [2] to the registered user. The users get the
authenticated keys, which allows the user to access the public visible Tweets. Based
on the search method and search key words, it provides the relevant message to the
user. The following subsection explains briefly about data collection, extraction of
short URLs, feature extraction and classification.
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Figure 5.3: Example of short URLs in Twitter
Figure 5.4: Data Collection by Twitter API
Data Collection by Twitter API
The REST API 5.3 provide programmatic access to read and write Twitter data. Au-
thor a new Tweet, read author profiles and follower data, and more. The REST API
identifies Twitter applications and users using OAuth; responses are available in JSON.
After collecting the tweets from the public domain from tweets from the twitter by ap-
plying streaming methods like on current trends we have extracted the required data
from tweets which contains URLs for example as below for bit.ly URLs short. We
Figure 5.5: Tweets from Twitter
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Ranking Table
URLs Service
Provider
Count
Bit.ly 139253
t.co 85321
Tiny.com 62478
Goo.gl 10122
ow.ly 8092
others 2300
Table 5.1: Ranking Table
have followed followed the same approach for the Facebook. But we have observed
that accessing of the data from the Facebook on public domain is very restrictive. We
have applied this method to collect both and short URLs. The following Table 5.1
shows the example of the short URLs that we have collected from the twitter.
Our total collection of URLs of nearly 312000 URLs compromising of about both
long and short URLs. The following Ranking Tables give the of URLs collection.
The following ranking Table 5.1 gives us the information that the most number of
users both genuine and attackers have heavily depended on the short URLs services for
both spaces reduce methodology and for trading illicit content on the Social Networks.
From the ranking Table we can conform that the most number of users has heavily used
on bit.ly which has outset the other URL services which followed by the twitter short
URL services t.co, followed by the Tiny.URLs, goo.gl, followed ow.ly and other(which
constitute few of other shorter URL services). The above Table 5.1 show the number
of short URLs that we have been collected from November 2014 to February 2015.
From the above Table, we have been seen that Bit.ly has generated more no of short
URLs followed by t.co and Tiny.com.
5.3 Detection Methodology
We have used wide range of online detection methodology Figure5.6 to detect whether
the collected URLs are malicious or non-malicious . The following fig explain the
method we have employ to detect the URLs are malicious or benign . Virus Total [14]
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Figure 5.6: Labelling Approach
stores all the analyses it performs, this allows users to search for reports given an MD5,
SHA1, SHA256 or URL. Search responses return the latest scan performed on the re-
source of interest. VirusTotal also allows you to search through the comments that
users post on files and URLs, inspect our passive DNS data and retrieve threat intelli-
gence de-tails regarding domains and IP addresses. Learn more about searching with
Virus Total.
PhishTank Phishing is a fraudulent attempt usually employ by the attackers through
email, to steal one’s personal information for their benefit. The best to protect from
such type of email is to know the behavior of the emails. Phishing emails generally ap-
pear that they are delivered by the well-know organizations and they personally entice
one individual to theft their personal information such as credit card number, social se-
curity number, account number, or password. Most often such mails are received from
the sender where the receiver does not have any account with them. Often the email
of the one individual data is sold to the attackers by the third party. One should keep
in mind that the legitimate organizer do not ask for the personal credential through
insecure email.
• Generally there are three types of e-mail
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Generic greeting Phishing email are sent in bulk. The Phish promotors usually buy
the credential information from the third party and they the phishing emails in bulk. To
incite the users in no time they use the “Generic Bank Customer “ so they don’t have
to type all the customer name and they these phish mail [14] one-by-one. If one donot
see their name they do not get any doubt.
Produced connection. Regardless of the possibility that a connection has a name you
perceive some place in it, it doesn’t mean it connections to the genuine association.
Move your mouse over the connection and check whether it coordinates what shows
up in the email. On the off chance that there is a discrepency, don’t tap on the connec-
tion. Additionally, sites where it is safe to enter individual data start with “https” —
the “s” remains for secure. In the event that you don’t see “https” don’t contain.
Demands individual data. The purpose of sending phishing email is to deceive you
into giving your own data. On the off chance that you get an email asking for your
own data, it is presumably a phishing attempt. Feeling of criticality. Web culprits need
you to give your own data now. They do this by making you think something has hap-
pened that obliges you to act quick. The speedier they get your data, the quicker they
can proceed onward to another casualty.
Google Safe Browsing [5] Figure 5.7 is an online detector service available that
provides the registered users API which enable the user to scan against the URLs. In
return it checks the whether the query URLs are malicious and non-malicious against
their frequently updated list of URLs . It check against the suspected phishing, mal-
ware and unwanted software.
The following are the services that the Google Safe browsing provides us.
• Warns the user before click on the web link by highlighting as malicious or non-
malicious.
• Prevents by posting the phishing URLs for on one’s site.
• Check against the malicious, phishing, worm against their updated list of do-
mains.
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Figure 5.7: Google Safebrowsing Snippet
Figure 5.8: Bit.ly Warning Page
Bit.ly is an short URL services. As bit.ly [3] does not apply any restrict to its user
in service providing it can only raise the warning page as shown below. We have used
above following online detection method to label our collected URLs which consist of
both long and short URLs as malicious and non-malicious. We also checked the URLs
against the public blacklists including McAfee, SiteAdvisor, URIBL, SURBL against
constantly updated list of phishing and malware.
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Analysis and Feature Selection of
URLs
6.1 Data Analysis
6.1.1 Creator Analysis
To know the behaviour of the attackers it is very important to know from where the
attackers has posted the URLs in the SNS. The following are the listed below informa-
tion from where the attackers have posted the URLs.
• twitterfeed
• tweetdeck Api
• roflquiz
• tweetmeme
• flocktome
• therealtwitter
6.2 Data Collection Approach
The twitter feed is utility allowed to feed content to Twitter to its registered user.
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Figure 6.1: Creator Analysis
Figure 6.2: Malicious Creator Analysis
Tweetdeck API provides services to the Tweetdeck, an open social media dash-
board application for management of Twitter.
Penguinfb is a service provided exclusively to send status updates from the Facebook.
Roflquiz is a website offering funny Twitter quizzes.
Tweetmeme is the popular organization which keeps track of popular links on Twitter.
The below Figure briefs that Tweetdeck with 19345 outset the remaining followed by
Tweetdeck API, Roflquiz, Tweetmeme. We have conducted our analysis over nearly
52000 URLs.
We have analyzed these URLs against the online detectors to find whether they are
malicious or non-malicious the following is the Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.1 help us to
analyze the impact of the services to spread malicious on the SNS.
6.3 Data Collection Approach
6.3.1 Analysis of URLs
As stated earlier, we have extracted the URLs from the tweets [23] which contains both
the short and long URL, and we also stated that the URLs are labelled by the online
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detectors.
6.3.2 Short URLs Analysis
Our dataset contains short URLs, thus it is very important to analyze the feature which
helps to analyze the whether the URLs is malicious or non-malicious. The dataset
contain the short URLs from the domain bit.ly [3], t.co [2], ow.ly, ad.ly, Goo.gl [5],
Tiny.com etc.
The following are the basic general information that every short URL services provides
to its registered users.
Basic information it gives the following attributes information. They are as follow
• id : it gives the details of the short URLs.
• longurl : it gives information of the long URLs to which short URL it points.
• title : it gives the title of the web page.
• creator : creator of the short URLs.
Click Source Analysis : In additional to the analysis of the short URLs by above
feature we ,the most important among the short URL provided is the click source anal-
ysis [34]. There are two types of the clicksource services that most of the short URL
services provides the are
• Country Source Analysis.
• Referrer Source Analysis.
Country Source Analysis The country source [22] click analysis Figure 6.3 will
help us to analyse the from which country a there is a spread of the spam and legitimate
URLs. During our data collection by the respective short URL services.
The following Figure6.4 shows the collection of the data URLs in the and the coun-
try clicks [15] on the spam URLs of sample 32133 URLs.
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Figure 6.3: Geographical Analysis
Figure 6.4: Total number of clicks by each country
Figure 6.5: Click on Malicious URLs
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References of Short URls
direct Click
http://twitter.com 392112
http://twitter.com/home 23244
http://www.yputube.com/watch 89322
http://www.facebook.com 32435
domain to know the domain of the URL
Clicks click count of the requested URLs
countries countries reffering click traffic
encoder the user who encode the user
reffers return about page referring click traffic
refferbydomain click group by referring short url domain
history created before ,created after information
prodoamin gives information about the domain of the
short URL
doaminclick click on the particular domain
domainshiorterncount specfied tracking domain
Table 6.1: Feature Provided by the Short URL services
The above Figure6.5 gives us the info about the number of URLs that each country
has click counts and on both the spam and legitimate URLs. It help us to analyse
the from which country the both long and short URLs are spreading more. From the
above it is clear that the US to in spreading both the short and long url which consist
of legitimate and spam followed by the japan and thailand. Hence from these we can
conclude that these 3 top most countries US, JP, TH top the list in spreading spam URL
in SNSs.
Referrer source analysis is the webpage to which the short URLs is referred. It
help us to analyse that the URLs that are provided by the short URLs are not only used
in the SNSs but also in the email. But the spammers has used many of the SNS like
Twitter and Facebook[1] etc.
The following feature Table6.1 show the number of the referrers of spam URLs
based on links.
6.3.3 Domain Analysis
Domain names are used to identify the source of the IP addresses. For example
www.nitrkl.ac.in whose Domain name is nitrkl.ac.in which consist of many IP address
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. Domain names are used to identify the particular webpage. Every domain has a suffix
that indicates which Top Level Domain(TLD) is belongs to Domain names are used
to identify one or more IP addresses. For example, the domain name microsoft.com
represents about a dozen IP addresses. Domain names are used in URLs to identify par-
ticular Web pages. For example, in the URL http://www.pcwebopedia.com/index.html,
the domain name is pcwebopedia.com. Every domain name has a suffix that indicates
which (TLD) it belongs to. For example
• gov - Government agencies
• edu - Educational institutions
• org - Organizations (nonprofit)
• mil - Military
• com - commercial business
• net - Network organizations
• ca - Canada
• th - Thailand
Because the Internet is based on IP addresses, not domain names, every web server
requires a Domain Name System (DNS) server to translate domain names into IP ad-
dresses.
Because of the availability of the Domains in the market at a cheaper or lesser rate
the attackers are using the Domain as the vehicle to carry out their illicit work. Hence
in our research work we have analyse the Domain of the most of the spam URLs. From
this, we have analyse that the attacker are just concentrating on most of the spam URLs
form the few concentrating domains Figure6.6 only. The following Tables 6.1 shows
the few top URLs that the spammers are employ.
Domain age Most of the spammers have registered that their domain which has
lives for short time. This showed that the malicious domain is the short lives domain.
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Figure 6.6: Snippet for Domain Analysis
Figure 6.7: Collection for Domain Analysis
34
CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS AND FEATURE SELECTION OF URLS
Domain Analysis
URL Doamin count
http://rnqqvdxji.myftp.com myftp.com 1213
http://ogqumk.serveftp.com serveftp.com 1000
http://tfdeqkrfj.servettp.com serveftp.com 1324
http://fmvks.serveftp.com serveftp.com 4343
http://crjstqrmeb.myftp.com myftp.com 4754
http://aapyczwshw.myftp.com myftp.com 2134
http://jrkgaxeust.myftp.com myftp.com 5634
http://fkwwoqdr.myftp.com myftp.com 2324
http://fyeyck.myftp.com myftp.com 1043
http://fyeyck.myftp.com myftp.com 5356
http://aapyczwshw.myftp.com myftp.com 2134
http://ozpojs.myftp.com myftp.com 4355
http://aapyczwshw.myftp.com myftp.com 4355
Table 6.2: Domain Analysis
The spammers has used these techniques to evades the security check . When we have
used the APG anti-virus to check the domain we have analyse that the domain is no
more in active state.
From the Table 6.2 we can conclude that the attackers are mainly dependent on few
domains to trade their illicit malicious content on the SNSs. We have also concluded
that these domains URLs are short lived. By these adopted mechanism we can say
that the there is community who does these specific work in a secure manner such that
within less time they are able to achieve their target in less time.
6.4 Analysis of Long URLs
Many research work has done for the analysis of the features of the long URLs which
help them to detect the malicious and non-malicious URLs. It is fact that the short
URLs by themselves does not include the physical properties of the URLs hence it
is much needed them to convert to long URL to study some of the available features
Some of the features that we used to analyse their behaviour as follow.
Though crawling of the web page is the most effective method to evaluate the URLs
as malicious and non-malicious but it turned to a very difficult as it consume more time.
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Long URLs Analysis
Feature Description Malicious(%) Non-
malicious(%)
Username in URLs 0.33 0.08
Password in URLs 0.23 0.00
’ ı´n Querypart 3.45 10.43
Digit[0-9] in the host 30.06 3.11
’ı´n URL 2.02 9.03
Table 6.3: KeyWord features of Long URL
Therefore, we adopted to know the available URL feature behaviour to analyse them.
Some of the feature used in our research as below.
Host based features: These features help us to analyse the features of the URLs
based on the hostname portion of the URLs. They help us to approximate the to de-
cide whether the URL are malicious or not. They are able to identify us to to know
‘owns’ the URLs and form which geographical location they are managed. Some of
the features are explained below.
• WHOIS information : This feature gives us the information about the domain name
registered dates, there registration etc. So if a set of malicious domains are regis-
tered by the some individual we have concluded such registered as an malicious
URLs.
• Location : This refers to the hosts geography, IP address prefix, and autonomous
system (AS) number.
• Members in blacklists : To mark some of the domain as a malicious or not we have
used third party submitted blacklist against the marked list of domains.
• Red Flag Key words : This red flag word Table 6.3 are the standard word which
are used by the research in determining the URLs are malicious or not. We have
used some of the most popular feature in determining the maliciousness of the
URLs.
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Results
7.1 Approach for Classicication
Classification is considered as an light weight operation for analyse the URLs whether
it is a malicious or non-malicious. Since though the crawling webpage method is
considered as an most effective method in reality it come with the time as a cost. In
our research we have used most popular Machine tool ‘Weka’ as an classifier for our
dataset.
7.1.1 Machine Learning Classification
Machine learning classifier act as a teacher, which predict probability instance class
based on the predefine features. Weka is a free software package with various classi-
fier and we use Naı¨ve Bayes Classifier. In this section we discuss how we organise our
dataset to classify using the ‘Weka software’.
Figure 7.1: Classification Model
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Figure 7.2: Machine Learning Classifier
Now we describe the way of classification of malicious users. Initially dataset
is divided into training dataset (80%), testing dataset (20%). In order to assess the
most efficient mechanism to detect malicious accounts, we inspected various machine
learning algorithm. All below classifiers are the standard classifiers and widely used
in solving problems.
7.1.2 Supervised Learning Algorithms
The following is the detail description about the classifiers.
Naı¨ve Bayes Classifier
Naı¨ve based classifiers is based on the probability and based on applying Bayes theo-
rem with strong independence assumption. The descriptive term for the above proba-
bility model is “independent feature model”.
Naı¨ve Bayes classifier assumes that particular class feature presence or absence is un-
related to the other class feature presence or absence. In this classifier, we have a
hypothesis that the given data belongs to the related class. Precise nature of the prob-
ability model, in supervised learning settings we can train naı¨ve Bayes classifier very
efficiently. In many practical applications, it uses maximum likelihood for parameter
estimation. In many complex real world situations, naı¨ve Bayes classifier works well.
The advantage of naı¨ve Bayes classifier is that for estimate the parameters it require
only the small amount of training data.
Naı¨ve Bayes probabilistic model
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The probability model is a conditional model over a dependent class variable with
limited number of outcomes means classes, conditions on the feature variables F1 to
Fn.
P (c/F1, F2....Fn) (7.1)
If the value of n is large, basing a model is infeasible. Then we reformulating the
model then it feasible or tractable.
P (c/F1, F2....Fn) = ((p(c)p(F1...Fn))/c)/(p(F1.....Fn)) (7.2)
The above equation can be written plain English as follows
posterior=(prior*likelihood)/evidence
In reality we are only concentrating on numerator, because denominator not de-
pending on the class c and values of features F.
Decision Tree Classifier
Decision tree most popular classifier which generates a tree like structure feature
names corresponding to internal nodes feature values corresponding to branches, and
class labels corresponding to leaf nodes. In this each node represents the test on the
attributes i.e. decisions of the attribute. If the attribute is satisfies the required condition
based on that it divide the data. Tree display the relationships among attributes are
there in the training data set. Decision tree is predictive model that uses a set of binary
rules applied to calculate the target value. Constructing the decision tree is done by
selecting the attributes that splits the training data in proper class i.e. legitimate and
malicious classes. Decision trees implemented based on the information gain. Which
is based on the entropy. If the entropy is low then the set is homogeneity of type
and if entropy is zero then the set is contains only one type of data. Once identified
splitting attribute then rest of the training data are pushing down the tree i.e. data that
is satisfying the splitting criteria are thrown into the “true” side of the tree. While, if
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the data is not satisfies the required criteria are thrown into the “false” side of the tree.
The above process is repeated until the each node in the tree contains data of the same
class, at that it store the class label. During the classification, it predicts the class of
an unknown data based on criteria defined over the node, starting from the root node.
If the attribute in the data satisfies the condition then the classifier follows the “YES”
class. If not satisfies then it follows the “NO” class. It checks the each criteria in the
right path until reaching the leaf nodes.
Evaluation Metric From the confusion matrix table 7.1 Accuracy (A) and F-
measure are the metrics which are used for the evaluation of the classifier performance.
F- Measure is defined in terms of Recall (R) and Precision (P). If evaluation metrics
having higher value, then the classifier is best suitable for data set. The evaluation
metrics described effectively by confusion matrix.
Table 7.1: Confusion Matrix
Malicious Legitimate
Malicious TP FN
Legitimate FP TN
True Positive (TP): Malicious samples are labelled as a Malicious.
False Negative(FN):Malicious samples are labelled as a benign(non-malicious).
False Positive (FP):Benign samples are labelled as a Malicious.
True Negative (TN):Benign samples are labelled as a Malicious.
P =
TP
(TP + FP )
(7.3)
R =
TP
(TP + FN)
(7.4)
F −Measure = 2 ∗ (P ∗R)
(P +R)
(7.5)
A =
(TP + TN)
TP + FN + FP + TN
(7.6)
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Figure 7.3: URLs vs Online Detectors
Figure 7.4: Classify URLs vs Online Detectors
7.2 Our Experimental Results
Our experimental result is briefly explained as below
URLs vs. Online Service Detectors
The Figure7.3 and Figure7.4 URLs against Online Service Detectors. We have
gone through many online service detectors like Virus Total, Sucuri, Bit.ly, Phish Tank
.Totally we went through 63 Online Detectors Services. From the Figure 7.3and Figure
7.4we can see that top 3 detection services (Fortinet, Kaspersky, Netcraft) are able to
detect most of the URLs as malicious and non-malicious.
URLs vs. Clicks
The Figure7.5 and Figure7.6 shows Number of clicks against URLs. We can see
Figure 7.5: URLs vs. Clicks
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Figure 7.6: Classify URL vs. Clicks
Figure 7.7: URLs vs. Geographical Analysis
from the Figure 7.5 and Figure 7.6 most of the malicious URLs are in between 0-
7 clicks only. The reasons behind for the low clicks may be the spam filters have
detected early these malicious URLs and blocked them.
The Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8 shows URLs against Red Flag Words(for example
the URLs may contain Freemoney, Congrates, Winner, Please Fill). Here each Red
Flag Words are given a standard value Ranging from 0-1 in percentage.
7.2.1 Classification Result
Figure 7.8: Classify URLs vs. Geographical
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Table 7.2: Comparison of Classifiers
Evalution Metric Naive
Bayesian
Decision
Tree
K-Star
Accuracy 95.41% 89.9% 90.4%
F-Measure(Malicious) 81.0% 64.4% 76.3%
F-Measure(Legitimate) 95.5% 93.4% 94.0%
True Positive Rate 88.2% 80.9% 79.0%
False Positive Rate 93.6% 90.1% 93.0%
Positive Predictive Rate 74.9% 53.5% 73.7%
Negative Predictive Rate 97.3% 97.1% 94.8%
From the above Table 7.2.1, we can see that Naı¨ve Bayes outperforms the other classi-
fication algorithm with an accuracy of 95.41%.
7.3 Conclusion
Our research includes the large-scale experimental study on detection of spam URLs
which include both long and short Urls. We have nearly collected of about 1,20000
URLs which consist of nearly 44.8% are spam URLs. Our collection doesn’t confirm
to only specific services doamin ,but our collection includes URLs from various do-
main like Ow.ly,t.co ,Bit.ly ,goo.gl etc. Our experiment includes 9 standard features
of both short and long URLs. In our classification Naı¨ve Bayes Classification resulted
as an optimum classification with 95.41% accuracy. We have successfully shown the
security gap that existed in many of the Social Networks.
7.4 Limitation
To find out the some features of the URLs we dependent on online sources like Virus
Total, Phish Tank and Bit.ly. We cannot guarantee about the credibility of these ser-
vices. In future they may change their evaluation method to detect the URLs malicious
or not.
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